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Aggregation, Community, and the Line Between
Elizabeth ChambleeBurch*
I.

INTRODUCTION

As class action theorists, we tend to think heavily about when and
whether to certify a class-whether attorneys are seeking principally
equitable relief for a Rule 23(b)(2) class, what the limits of a fund should
be before certifying a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class, and generally whether a
group is cohesive enough for certification. Sometimes we focus so much
on determining when plaintiffs have met the certification threshold that
we neglect to reassess the line itself. To some, class action line drawing
is an ontological question. If a group meets certain certification criteria,
then Rule 23 transforms the individual claims of those within it into
"entity claims," making the client the entity itself.' Consequently, some
scholars suggest that a certified class may have an ontological status
apart from the aggregate of its individual members. 2 Others find this
preposterous. Of course, the theories differ slightly depending on the
type of class. But all theories employ roughly the same yardstick: do the
form a sufficiently cohesive group
procedurally aggregated individuals
4
sue?
to
decision
the
before
Given this symposium's topic-the state of aggregate litigation and
the boundaries of class actions in the decade after Amchem Products, Inc.

Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law.

I am indebted to Curtis

Bridgeman, Thomas Burch, Brannon Denning, and Alexandra Lahav for their comments on previous
drafts, to symposium participants for their thought-provoking questions, and to Laura Hines and the
Kansas Law Review for organizing this symposium.
1. David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
913, 919 (1998).
2. See, e.g., id. at 918-19 (noting that "the entity is the litigant and the client"); see also
Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 26-27
(1996); cf Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions,
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2002) ("[T]here is increasing skepticism over the view that a
class action is simply an unaltered aggregation of individual claims.").
3. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, LitigantAutonomy, and the
Foundationsof ProceduralDue Process,95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1590-97 (2007).
4. This is occasionally assessed at the time the plaintiffs move for class certification, if, for
instance, they have narrowed their proposed class definition.
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v. Windsor 5 and Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp.6 -- the time is ripe to challenge
our assumptions about this yardstick. Accordingly, this Article examines
group cohesion and asks whether the current line is the only dividing line
or even the correct one. Although I rely on class action analogies, I am
particularly concerned about mass-tort litigation that proceeds as
nonclass litigation because it fails Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance test.
A closer look at the aims of our current line reveals that it depends
on common traits among class members to justify interest representation.
This, of course, is not a new revelation, nor is it particularly surprising
that scratching beneath the veneer of commonality often reveals a bevy
of conflict. Yet, historically, class action treatment traced actual group
cohesion, which suggests an alternative means for binding present
litigants in nonclass aggregation if we are less concerned about freezing
interests in their pristine pre-litigation form. If the judicial system
encourages procedurally aggregated plaintiffs to communicate with one
another about their litigation aims, injuries, and intentions, then they may
form genuinely cohesive groups. Accordingly, if courts look beyond the
proxies used to evaluate pre-litigation unity to actual cohesion after the
decision to sue, then they should permit like-minded plaintiffs to bind
their collective interests.
Part II considers some of the ironies in the current line-drawing
scheme to make the case for a different line in nonclass aggregation. In
particular, Part II questions the authenticity of the "presumption of
cohesion" that attaches to Rule 23(b)(2) class actions and whether the
proxies used to test cohesion in Rule 23(b)(3) classes are realistic gauges
of homogeneity. Because group litigation evolved historically from
actual, interconnected group rights, the modern iteration of Rule 23 tacks
the moniker "cohesion" onto procedurally aggregated individuals with
superficial similarities. This leads some scholars to claim that the class
action subverts individual autonomy and threatens fundamental aspects
of a liberal democracy.
Still, my aim is not to attack the current line as it relates to class
actions. Rather, it is to say that if we are willing to look for genuine
cohesion among individuals who are procedurally aggregated but lack
sufficiently common traits before the decision to sue, then we will find
an alternative and perhaps more compelling justification for binding
collective interests. Part III thus explains how genuine cohesion and

5. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
6. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
7. See infra Part ll.B.

2010]

AGGREGATION, COMMUNITY, AND THE LINE BETWEEN

891

community among plaintiffs might occur. While our basic definitions of
community remain the same, modem communication methods have
made it possible to develop and maintain affective ties with people
outside of our immediate geographic location. These new media allow
plaintiffs without previous affiliations to create and sustain a sense of
community based on their shared histories, experiences, and attributes.
Finally, Part IV draws on the dominant justifications for group
litigation--consent and interest representation-to explore this
alternative line-drawing scheme in terms of political theory.
Encouraging plaintiffs to form groups and reach decisions through
deliberation relies on a mix of individual consent and moral obligation.
Allowing plaintiffs to exercise their free will when deciding whether to
associate with others preserves the liberal tenet of self-determination and
escapes the anti-democratic criticism leveled at class actions. Yet, a
purely liberal approach fails to capture the obligatory aspect of reciprocal
promises to cooperate and the communal obligations that attach.
Although plaintiffs voluntarily enter into the group, once they are group
members and have tied together their collective litigation fates, they
should not be permitted to exit when doing so violates their
commitments. Of course, the community itself determines the content of
its members' rights and obligations to one another. Thus, this section
concludes by explaining the rationale for group autonomy in terms of
pluralism and communitarianism.
II.

THE PARTY LINE

The current line-drawing regime for class actions uses a snapshot
approach: courts determine whether a homogeneous group of people
with shared traits existed or shared those attributes before the litigation.
The idea is to adjudicate rights in their pre-litigation form. In this
picture, rights and obligations are frozen in time; the "groupness" of a set
of individuals is static. Consider, for example, how judges determine
whether to certify Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) claims.
First, consider Rule 23(b)(2), where "the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so
that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole."8 Typical (b)(2) classes
include employment-discrimination claims, where the employer fails to
hire or promote people of a certain race or gender, or civil-rights

8.

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
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violations, such as the school-desegregation cases. 9 Because (b)(2)
classes remedy group injuries through uniform relief, courts look for a
clear group trait like race or gender and presume that class members are
cohesive and homogeneous so long as that unifying trait existed before
the litigation.1 ° Because (b)(2) class actions do not require opt-out
opportunities," assuming cohesion allays judges' qualms about dueprocess concerns such as personal notice and the ability to exit. A court
daring to recognize potentially divergent interests would be hard-pressed
not to provide notice and opt-out rights.12 Consequently, presuming that
class members' interests are cohesive, even when that presumption is
fictitious, prevents the instabilities and opt-outs that jeopardize the
collective good in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.
Presuming pre-litigation cohesion is frequently just a convenient
assumption. Take, for instance, employment class actions where the
group is ready-made: a certain category of employees work for a given
employer. As anyone who has been around a university department
surely knows, professors may disagree over everything from curricular
reform to which speakers to invite. It is not surprising, then, that in any
given employment class action there will be diverse preferences. Some
faithful employees will eschew the decision to sue at all, others will
worry about retaliation, others may be risk adverse, and still others may
want different relief. 13
Some courts are willing to look behind the imperial curtain and allow
parties to rebut the "presumption of cohesion."' 14 For instance, Judge
9. See id. advisory committee's note to 1966 Amendment.
10. See, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 165 (2d Cir. 2001)
(noting a "presumption of cohesion and unity between absent class members and the class
representatives" when "class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief is sought"); Allison v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 402 (5th Cir. 1998) (race); Holmes v. Cont'l Can Co., 706 F.2d
1144, 1155 n.8 (11 th Cir. 1983) (race and gender); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239,
248-49 (3d Cir. 1975) (gender); Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 257 F.R.D. 159, 170-72 (S.D. Ind. 2009)
(finding age insufficient for a child-labor claim under the Alien Tort Statute); In re Methyl Tertiary
Butyl Ether Prod. Liab. Litig. (MTBELitig.), 209 F.R.D. 323, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Class members
in a (b)(2) action must share some 'preexisting legal relationship or [a] significant common trait such
as race or gender."' (quoting Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1155)).
11. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)-(3).
12. See Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 139, 216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir.
2000).
13. Similar problems arose in the 1970s school-busing cases; many parents would have
preferred to avoid busing, violence, and poor (but integrated) schools. See generally Derrick A. Bell
Jr., Serving Two Masters:Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School DesegregationLitigation,
85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).

14. Courts occasionally allow Rule 23(b)(2) classes to progress as such on the liability phase,
but then permit notice and opt-out rights if class cohesion fails during the remedial stage. See, e.g.,
Robinson, 267 F.3d at 166-67; Latino Officers Ass'n v. City of New York, 209 F.R.D. 79, 93
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Scheindlin allowed defendants to rebut homogeneity by demonstrating
that individual issues existed in the MTBE litigation.15 But other courts
hold tightly to this presumption even in the face of heterogeneity.' 6 The
point is, even in (b)(2) classes, plaintiffs' opinions about risk, relief, and
strategy may differ vastly even though plaintiffs share a similar trait
before suing. 7 Consequently, this assumption often camouflages what is
truly only an amalgamation of people's divergent interests.
By contrast, in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, the predominance test
asks "whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation."'' 8
Cohesion legitimizes collective
representation. But this is not necessarily group cohesion. Courts
typically use common characteristics-such as the same physical
injuries, product, disaster, circumstances, or state laws-as proxies for
class cohesion and homogeneity.' 9 The commonalities binding the
proposed class must then predominate over individual interests. One
unusual example to the contrary is in appointing a lead plaintiff in Rule
23(b)(3) securities class actions. There, courts have been willing to
designate a group as the lead plaintiff if its members have either a prelitigation or a post litigation relationship so long as they are cohesive,
function together smoothly, and monitor the lawyers. 20 To evaluate
cohesiveness, courts do consider whether group members have a prelitigation relationship, but they also examine the members' litigation
involvement, plans to cooperate, sophistication level, and whether they
chose counsel or vice versa. 21

(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
15. MTBELitig., 209 F.R.D. at 343.
16. See, e.g., Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1130-32 (D.D.C. 1989). Before this
presumption emerged, some courts observed that unanimity was impossible and not a class action
prerequisite. See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 485-86 (5th Cir.
1982); Wyatt ex rel. Rawlins v. Poundstone, 169 F.R.D. 155, 161 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
17. See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1183-84
(1982).
18. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).
19. See id.
at 624.
20. See, e.g., Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., Nos. 07 Civ. 8538, 07 Civ. 8808, 07 Civ.
9651, 07 Civ. 10400, 07 Civ. 10540, 2008 WL 2876373, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2008); In re
Flight Safety Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 124, 129 (D. Conn. 2005); Xianglin Shi v. Sina
Corp., Nos. 05 Civ. 2154 (NRB), 05 Civ. 2268 (NRB), 05 Civ. 2374 (NRB), 05 Civ. 2391 (NRB),
05 Civ. 2503 (NRB), 05 Civ. 2826 (NRB), 2005 WL 1561438, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2005); Local
144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 00-3605 (DRD), 2000 WL 33173017,
at *3-4 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2000); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 46
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
21. Varghese v. China Shenghuo Pharm. Holdings, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
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to

(b)(2)

is,

in

part,

economically driven. A request for money jeopardizes cohesion.
Courts assume that people pursuing monetary claims are a less cohesive
bunch both because monetary remedies are tied to individual merits and
divergent interests, and because the more one has to lose, the less she
may trust others with her claim.23 To be sure, part of the courts' concern
in (b)(3) classes is about due process-monetary claims carry with them
property rights that injunctive and declaratory relief lack. But the idea
that monetary remedies are inherently divisive, whereas injunctive or
declaratory relief is not, is at odds with reality. A generous explanation
for the difference might be the need for due process and its
corresponding right to opt out; yet, courts go further than that. They
imply that when money is at stake, we will all behave as homo
economicus and maximize our own outcome at the rest of the
participants' expense. 24 That is, we will elevate our own self-interest
over that of the other plaintiffs and thereby act discordantly.
The point thus far has been that courts use several proxies to gauge
pre-litigation homogeneity and unity among class members: in Rule
23(b)(2) class actions the proxy is uniform relief, and in Rule 23(b)(3)
class actions the proxy is preexisting common characteristics such as
physical injuries and shared circumstances. A closer look at the class
action's history reveals that these proxies evolved historically from
actual, interconnected group rights.
A.

The HistoricalLine

In medieval times, life revolved around one's group memberships;
the individual's rights and privileges stemmed not from her autonomy
but from her membership in a particular group. Parishes, villages,
guilds, boroughs, and frankpledge tithings were social and economic
organizations as well as groups with collective obligations and rights.2 5
22.

Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'r, Local No. 139, 216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir.

2000).
23. See Barabin v. Aramark Corp., No. 02-8057, 2003 WL 355417, at *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 24,
2003) (individual merits); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1998)
(individual merits); Ammons v. La-Z-Boy, Inc., No. 1:04-CV-67 TC, 2008 WL 5142186, at * 19 (D.
Utah Dec. 5, 2008) (decreased trust); Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 245 F.R.D. 478, 486
(D. Colo. 2007) (decreased trust). It is equally plausible that a plaintiff would be more likely to trust
others when more money is at stake, particularly if they are experts and she is not.
24. See Barabin, 2003 WL 355417, at * 1; Allison, 151 F.3d at 412-13.
25. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION 41-49 (1987). Yeazell explains that a "frankpledge" was essentially a policing institution in
which young males formed groups that were responsible for one another's good behavior. Id. at 43-
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Communal obligations and collective power were coterminous. These
joint obligations ran so deep that collectors could enforce debts from one
member by demanding payment from another, simply because of her
membership in the same community. 26 Members of rural communitiessuch as villages, frankpledge tithings, and parishes-did not choose to
become group members in any meaningful, voluntary sense; rather,
membership arose from geographic location.27 Townsfolk, grouped in
exclusive guilds and boroughs, on the other hand, voluntarily chose
group membership by accepting responsibility and financial
obligations.28
Whether chosen or not, group membership and its
collective rights and obligations was a way of life that largely went
unquestioned.
After the medieval period, plagues, famine, and the Reformation led
to more modem bureaucratization and consolidated power in boroughs
with taxes and corporations.29 Social groups were no longer coterminous
with political ones. As group litigation became an anomaly rather than
the norm, the nineteenth-century public felt the need to explain it in
terms of consent and representation. 30 As Stephen Yeazell describes it,
in the mid-1800s, the political thought of Frederic Calvert concerning
interest representation and Edmund Burke's notions about virtual
31
representation reinvigorated group litigation.
It is here that we begin to see an interweaving of political theory and
procedural thought. Grappling with the ideological tensions that persist
today, Calvert explained group litigation as interest representation and
32
assumed that one person could represent others with similar interests.
Dividing "interest" into two meanings, he thought the word could mean
either an interest in the property or transaction, or an interest in the
question the litigation presents. 33 Put differently, one might be interested
in the object of the lawsuit or in the suit's subject matter. This latter
interest paved the way for associations-such as homeowners'

44.
26. Id. at 61-63.
27. Id. at 41-52.
28. Id. at 58-68.
29. Id. at 100-08, 123-25.
30. Id at 178.
31. Id. at 198-210.
32. Robert G. Bone, Personaland Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of
Adjudicative Representation,70 B.U. L. REV. 213,224 (1990) (reviewing YEAZELL, supranote 25).
33. FREDERIC CALVERT, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW RESPECTING PARTIES TO SUITS IN
EQUITY 5-7 (London, Saunders and Benning 1837).
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associations, unions, and lodges-to sue on
34 their members' behalf and
purportedly protect their collective interest.
Meanwhile, a few years earlier, Edmund Burke promoted a political
version of interest representation and contended that there was no need
for a geographic locale to have its own representative so long as another
representative elsewhere shared that locale's interests. 35 From this came
the idea of virtual representation where a nonparty is situated such that
"one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to
be his virtual representative. 3 6 In both political and procedural theory
then, this notion further distanced representation from consent and tied it
instead to interests.
From this brief historical summary, three key points emerge. First,
our current line-drawing regime, which uses proxies for determining
whether group homogeneity existed before the litigation, is rooted in (1)
what used to be an actual community and (2) interest representation.
Thus, in one sense, these proxies have become convenient fictions for
assuming group cohesion, much like the renewed judgment as a matter of
law is a convenient turn of phrase to circumvent the Seventh
Amendment's reexamination clause.3 7 The historical predicates to these
proxies turned on a mix of consent-through voluntarily joining social
organizations in medieval times or, according to Calvert, joining a
lawsuit affecting one's interests-and purely similar interests. Second, it
becomes apparent that our now near-divorced conceptions of law and
sociality used to be quite closely linked. Rather than thinking about
procedural law or social norms, both are integral to a holistic
understanding of either. Our inherent sociality and ideology matter
immensely to our understanding of group cohesion, group representation,
and procedural aggregation. Third, scratching beneath the surface of the
modem-day presumptions of class cohesion commonly reveals
heterogeneity, not homogeneity. Accordingly, in a society founded on
individual rights, we continue to struggle with notions of consent and
interest representation to justify binding collective interests.

34. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP.
CT. REv. 337,364 (1999).
35. YEAZELL, supra note 25, at 205-06.
36. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1975). Taylor v. Sturgell
contains the Supreme Court's most recent word on virtual representation. 128 S.Ct. 2161, 2178
(2008) (disapproving a theory of preclusion by virtual representation). Intervention in Rule 24 relies
on much the same concept.
37. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (allowing renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law).
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B. DemocraticDrawbacks of the CurrentLine
In its modem form, the class action has been attacked from all sides
for many reasons. Of particular interest here, however, is the criticism
that current class action litigation is undemocratic. As Martin Redish
contends, the class action reworks substantive laws and thereby
circumvents the democratic process by undermining accountability and
representation. 38 He sees today's class action as essentially a shell game,
a purportedly procedural device that does not actually compensate and
operates instead as a tool for rogue bounty hunters who act without the
legitimacy of substantive authorization. 39 Reading the class action's
historical development, he contends:
On the one hand, while early English practice did authorize certain
forms of purely collective adjudication, it appears that in none of those
contexts were individuals forced to adjudicate substantive rights that, in
their pristine pre-litigation form, were individually held. Rather,
collective adjudication was permitted only when the individual's
substantive rights were held as part of a pre-existing entity.40
Underlying this critique is the further argument that forcing collective
adjudication of individually held rights subverts individual autonomy, a
concept so important to modem American thought that it runs throughout
both our judicial and political system. Here, Redish contends that "the
modem class action also threatens core notions of liberal democracy on a
micro level, by restricting the individual's autonomous ability to employ
the judicial process as a means of protecting her substantive legal
rights. 'Al In this manner, class actions undermine individual liberal
values such as integrity, autonomy, and self-worth.
In sum, our current pre-litigation line-drawing scheme: (1)
presupposes unity where none exists; (2) relies on proxies such as skin
color, gender, common injuries, similar circumstances, and comparable
state laws to determine whether individuals, who may be nothing more
than procedurally aggregated, constitute a "group"; (3) employs
representative notions based on the fiction these proxies create and
thereby undermines individual autonomy and integrity; and (4) raises

38.
and the
2003 U.
39.
40.
41.

MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE 21-61 (2009); Martin H. Redish, Class Actions
Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals,
CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 81-82.
Redish, supra note 38.
REDISH, supra note 38, at 230.
Id. at 229.
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democratic concerns about accountability and representation. On the
positive side, this line provides a fixed point in time for assessing Rule
23's requirements and thereby avoids the ambiguity of assessing
cohesion for a moving target. Rule 23(b)(2)'s presumption of cohesion
is pragmatic, if not realistic. Without the presumption, divergent
interests could ruin the efficiency and momentum gained by collectivity
as well as make uniform relief difficult to fashion. Proxies such as skin
color, gender, and common circumstances are easier for both lawyers and
judges to assess on the fly; they need not dig too deeply to determine
cohesion. Finally, because class actions by definition involve absent
class members, the current line avoids the stickiness of attempting to
involve thousands of potentially disinterested people in the litigation and
thereby undermining the class's efficiency gains.
This pre-litigation line also means that courts certify fewer putative
(b)(3) class actions, particularly products-liability or personal-injury
claims. The combination of Amchem, Ortiz, the Class Action Fairness
Act, and the trend toward requiring plaintiffs to establish Rule 23's
certification criteria by a preponderance of the evidence has substantially
decreased the likelihood that a judge will certify a mass-tort class
action.42 Yet, this does not mean that these actions will not proceed en
masse. One need look only to the recent Zyprexa or Vioxx litigation for
evidence of thousands of parties litigating nominally related claims in the
same forum.43 But, because these claims are not certified as class
actions, they proceed in a procedural no man's land-somewhere in
between individual litigation and class action litigation, but without the
protections of either. 4

42. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). The following cases illustrate the preponderance of the
evidence standard as well as a corresponding willingness to look into the merits of the case at class
certification. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311-12 (3d Cir. 2008)
("[T]he task for plaintiffs at class certification is to demonstrate that the element of antitrust impact
is capable of proof at trial .... "); Oscar Private Equity lnvs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d
261, 268 (5th Cir. 2007) ("Rule 23's requirements must be given their full weight independent of the
merits."); In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 40 (2d Cir. 2006) ("This standard of review implies that
a district judge has some leeway as to Rule 23 requirements .. "); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs.,
Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[I]f some of the considerations under Rule 23(b)(3)...
overlap the merits. . . then the judge must make a preliminary inquiry into the merits.").
43. In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611-12 (E.D. La. 2008); In re Zyprexa
Prod. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Howard M. Erichson,
Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of CoordinationAmong Counsel in
Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 386-401 (2000) (discussing plaintiffs' coordination).
44. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations 8
(Feb. 28, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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As I have explored elsewhere, this no man's land fosters: (1) agency
problems between the attorney and her clients (misallocation incentives,
inadequate attorney-client communication, and an inability for clients to
monitor their case); (2) group problems between nominally related
plaintiffs (incentives to holdout in settlements requiring near unanimity,
outliers who want no part of group membership, and subgroup
competition); and (3) competition problems between plaintiffs'
attorneys.45 Accordingly, the remainder of this Article focuses on
nonclass aggregation and imagines that drawing another line might
overcome some of the concerns with the current class action scheme.
Just as courts have allowed cohesive groups to serve as lead plaintiffs in
securities class actions, this new line is based on actual group cohesion,
regardless of whether that cohesion predates or postdates the decision to
sue. It would also enable present plaintiffs with similar litigation ends
and injuries to consciously join forces and bind their interests. After all,
the current line already joins litigants based on the fiction of cohesion.
Imagine then the very real justification for binding individual claims
when that cohesion is genuine and litigants actually form a group based
on shared interests, desires, or ends.
III. POST AGGREGATION COMMUNITY
While the class action line, which requires some approximation of a
preexisting group, has remained relatively stationary since its initial 1966
With economic
iteration, our notion of community is fluid.
our ideas about
with
it,
that
comes
independence and the autonomy
community and social networks have evolved. While most of us would
balk at having to pay our neighbor's debts, as individuals did in medieval
times, we are seeing a resurgence of community in both old and new
outlets. First, the old: given the recent economic downturn, at least
anecdotally, people are relying on one another again and, as the
catchphrase goes, "building stronger communities." There has been a
rise in local food co-ops, community gardens, ride shares, buy-local
Second, the new: the Internet
movements, and microcredit projects. 46ene:teItre
45. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, LitigatingGroups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1, 9-16 (2009); see also
Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class
Collective Representation,2003 U. CI. LEGAL F. 519.
46. See generally Timothy C. Barmann, As Fuel Costs Rise, More People Opt to Share a Ride,
PROVIDENCE J., July 30, 2008, available at NEWS BANK, Record No. 20080730-PJ-RIDESHARING-20080730; John Harrington, Project Aims to Place a Garden Plot Within Walking
Distance of Every Home, INDEP. REC. (Helena, Mont.), Oct. 11, 2009, available at http://
Zlati Meyer,
www.helenair.com/lifestyles/article_44a0fdbc-b6la-llde-885a-001cc4c03286.html;
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has ushered in a community that is both virtual and social. We use text
messages, blogs, instant messaging, and e-mail to communicate with one
another. Social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, and
Linkedln allow us to stay in touch with people from our former high
school, college, and workplace communities. In this sense, social sites
reflect our offline, personal interaction.41 Sometimes these sites lead
people to deepen their friendships by turning acquaintances into real
friends. They also allow us to make new friends and join virtual
communities, groups, and message boards based on our common
interests. Put differently, we can expand our communality by sharing
information and joining collective efforts.48
Take, for example, the Navy's website for "moms," which includes
multiple discussion threads, groups such as "Moms of Officers" and
"Moms of Navy Musicians," meeting kits for gathering with other Navy
moms in one's hometown, and links to blog posts, photos, and videos.49
Its purpose is to give "members a place to discuss issues with others who
share common concerns" and "provide an environment of understanding,
comfort and belonging to all involved." 50 Similar websites exist for
Army wives, Marine Corps wives, and even military children. 5 1
Likewise, during the recent economic crisis, homeowners have formed
online groups and foundations to help individuals dealing with
foreclosure and refinancing. 52 Some of these communities even develop
from shared tragedies and the group litigation that ensues. There are, for
instance, websites dedicated to the September 11, 2001 tragedy where
53
people can post their stories and view pictures, videos, and documents;

Rising Gas Prices Fuel Rise in Office Carpooling: Workers Say They Save Big, Enjoy Company,
DET. FREE PRESS, May 14, 2007, at A3; Manoj Pant, Op-Ed., FinancialInclusion and Microcredit,
ECON. TIMES (India), July 11, 2008, available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion

Allie Shah,
/columnists/manoj-pant/Financial-inclusion-and-microcredit/articleshow/322I82.cms;
Stillwater Food Co-Op Has Built Community of Shoppers, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Mar. 4,
2008, available at http://www.startribune.com/local/east/16146732.html.
47. See NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS & JAMES H. FOWLER, CONNECTED 270-71 (2009) ("[A]t
their core, social-network sites primarily reflect offline interactions.").
48. See id at 275 (noting that communality has been modified by the Internet).
49. Navy for Moms, http://www.navyformoms.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
50. Navy for Moms, About Us, http://www.navyformoms.com/page/about-us (last visited Jan.
21, 2010).
51. Army Wives, http://www.armywives.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2010); Marine Corps Wives,
http://www.marinewives.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2010); Military Kidz, http://www.military
kidz.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
Avoid
Foreclosure,
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Avoid-Foreclosure/
52. See, e.g.,
(comprising a group of 854 members dedicated to helping "people get back on their feet" and
preventing people from going into foreclosure) (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
53. The September 11 Digital Archive, http://91 Idigitalarchive.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
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sites for survivors of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita; 54 and groups for
55
"People against Paxil" and Vioxx Plaintiff Education Groups.
Plaintiffs' attorneys form groups and consortia of their own, such as the
"Katrina Litigation Group." 56 In sum, commonalities ranging from
having a child in the Navy to mass disasters to tragic drug side effects
bring people together globally.
These new communication media take us from local communities to
worldwide communities that form from shared experiences, interests,
desires, and commitments. They augment our ideas of community. Our
fundamental notions about what constitutes a community have remained
consistent, but both the media and the moral obligations have evolved.
For instance, de Tocqueville's observation that associations shape
American societies remains true,5 7 but new communication means and
methods have made it possible to associate with people beyond our
territorial communities.
While some definitions of "community" are static, rooted in territory,
and include people living in the same area or interacting populations
(towns, neighborhoods, or cities), others capture the relational
community as "a group linked by a common policy" and "a body of
persons ... having a common history or common social, economic, and
political interests. 58 These latter definitions clarify that community is
not just about where we live, but about our relationships and affective
ties with one another. Community in this sense grows out of social
relationships with reciprocity and mutuality. 59 Thus, key features of the
54. Hurricane Digital Memory Bank, http://hurricanearchive.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
55. People Against Paxil, http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=5445754283 (last visited
Jan. 21, 2010); Paxil (and Other Antidepressants) Survivors, http://www.facebook.com
/group.php?gid=2246304004 (last visited Jan. 21, 2010); Vioxx Plaintiff Education Group,
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/MerckSettlement/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2010); see also Byron G.
Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 863,
919-21(2005).
56. For the opinion disqualifying the Katrina Litigation Group after Dickie Scruggs was
arrested, see McIntosh v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV 1080 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 4, 2008)
(Op. on Mot. to Disqualify), available at http://www.mssd.uscourts.gov/lnsurance%200pinions
/ch06cv 1080orderA912.pdf
57. In an often-cited passage, Alexis de Tocqueville states, "Americans of all ages, all
conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and
manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds... " 2
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 128 (Henry Reeve trans., Schocken Books
1961) (1835).
58. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, Community, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/community (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
59. See THOMAS BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 122-28 (1978);

Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: ResidentialAssociations and Community, 75
CORNELL L. REv. 1,25 (1989).
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definition used here include membership (belongingness with
boundaries), influence, integrating and fulfilling needs, and shared
emotional connections (history, experiences, and commonalities).60
When we compare these expansive definitions of community and the
evolving media for forming communities with our stationary legal ideas
about cohesion, our current line-drawing scheme appears outdated.
Cohesion is static in that courts measure the proxies-requesting uniform
relief and having common characteristics that predate the litigation-at a
particular point in time. And plaintiffs with procedurally aggregated tort
claims are unlikely to exhibit the fundamental attributes of a cohesive
local community-social bonds, social activities, and community
attachment. 61 But what if by using new media we could return to the
core cohesion seen in small, rural medieval communities without the
corresponding geographic restrictions? Put differently, what if we traced
actual cohesion regardless of when or where it arose? This amended
line-drawing scheme conceives of groups as individuals who exhibit
actual affective ties with each other and avoids, as Thomas Bender puts
it, the "cynical manipulation of symbols of community. 62 Bringing
litigants together in nonclass aggregation through multidistrict transfers,
claim consolidation, and party joinder can shape relationships, result in
plaintiffs forming social bonds, and change the character of those
associations into real communities.
Still, my intention is not to propose a radical restructuring of Rule 23
or to suggest that we re-envision the line for true class actions with
absent class members. Instead, my concern is with a particular subset of
would-be class litigation-mass-tort litigation-where plaintiffs care
enough to bring individual suits. Those suits might be aggregated by the
claimants, their attorneys, or administratively through multidistrict
transfer and consolidation before a single judge.63 Although these
plaintiffs have retained their own attorney and are present as compared
with absent class members, the sheer number of other plaintiffs makes it
difficult for attorneys to communicate regularly with their clients and
Therefore, it is in nonclass
means that clients tend to be poor monitors.
64
aggregation that I am suggesting a change.
60.

David W. McMillan & David M. Chavis, Sense of Community: A Definition and Theory, 14

J. COMM. PSYCHOL. 6,9 (1986).
61.

See generally John Kasarda & Morris Janowitz, Community Attachment in Mass Society, 39

AM. Soc. REv. 328 (1974) (describing how associational networks affect communities).
62.
63.

BENDER, supra note 59, at 144.
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 (Proposed Final Draft

2009).
64. This proposed change should not function retroactively to certify an overarching class
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If the current class action scheme justifies binding interests because
they are "similar" (interest representation), then the change that I am
suggesting is different in kind. It is based on neither a pure fiction of
similar interests nor on pure consent, but is a blend of the two, with
heavy weight on both. The basic idea is this: once aggregationprocedural or purposeful-brings people together, giving them the
opportunity to interact with one another and discuss their commonalities
Plus, new
may lead them to form actual, cohesive groups.
communication media make it possible for plaintiffs to interact regularly.
Given that "presumed cohesion" justifies binding absent litigants to a
class action judgment, if group cohesion in nonclass aggregation is real
then there is ample historical and theoretical justification for allowing
plaintiffs to limit their ability to pursue their own claims. When litigants
form groups and morally obligate themselves to other group members
through voluntary promises and assurances, it makes sense to reinforce
those obligations legally (or socially) and bind plaintiffs' collective
interests regardless of whether their cohesion predated or postdated the
decision to sue. 65 Because I have elaborated on both this theoretical
framework for litigating together and methods for implementing the
framework elsewhere, I won't rehash either here.66 Instead, first, by
reconsidering interest representation and consent in the context of
political theory, I suggest that redrawing the line around actual groups
avoids Redish's argument that group litigation is antidemocratic.
Second, continuing to explore the alternative line-drawing scheme in
political terms, the final section draws from pluralism and
communitarianism to sketch a political framework for promoting group
governance. Drawing this new line requires us to afford group autonomy
to plaintiffs 67by allowing them-with the help of a special officer-to
self-govern.

where none would exist otherwise.
65. Burch, supra note 45, at 41-47.
66. Burch, supra note 44; Burch, supra note 45.
67. I embrace a weaker form of "group autonomy" because the special officer serves an
advisory function. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains the notion of group autonomy
as follows:
When people living in some region of the world declare that their group has the right to
live autonomously, they are saying that they ought to be allowed to govern themselves.
In making this claim, they are, in essence, rejecting the political and legal authority of
those not in their group. They are insisting that whatever power these outsiders may have
over them, this power is illegitimate; they, and they alone, have the authority to
determine and enforce the rules and policies that govern their lives.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Personal Autonomy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personalautonomy/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
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IV. AGGREGATING AS A DEMOCRATIC ENTERPRISE
Thus far, I have contended that group cohesion, regardless of
whether it arises before or after the decision to sue, justifies binding
collective interests. Of course, this must be clarified a bit. In litigation,
this holds true only if-after proper sorting with the help of a third-party
68
neutral (the "special officer")-plaintiffs share means and ends.
Because plaintiffs aggregated procedurally under Rule 20 or transferred
through the multidistrict litigation statute may share only a common
question of law or fact, their hopes, desires, and intentions toward the
litigation may vary wildly. 69 But in the course of talking things over
with one another, plaintiffs might realize that their means and ends mesh.
They may begin to think of themselves as being in community with each
other. Smaller communities may exist within the larger body of
litigation, making the issue of governance between groups similar to that
between subgroups and the polity. With this similarity comes all of the
attendant problems of intergroup relationships, defining membership,
and group autonomy.
To explain how drawing a line around actual groups overcomes the
democratic critique in a way that class actions may not, consider again
the notions of consent and interest representation. When plaintiffs meet
one another, form groups, discuss their litigation ends, and further
specify those ends through deliberation, they have an opportunity to
participate and be heard in the process. Group deliberation thus serves as
a proxy for direct participation in the judicial process, which tends to
become less meaningful and practical as the number of plaintiffs
increase. 70
By both consenting-through making promises and
assurances to one another to cooperate-and by participating in the
decision-making process, individuals retain some autonomy and
influence over collective decisions. 7' Granted, because they are part of a
collective and "in it together," they have less autonomy than they might
in an individual lawsuit. But in exchange for pure autonomy, they gain
68. This idea and the use of a special officer is expanded greatly in Burch, supra note 44.
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006) (authorizing multidistrict litigation); FED. R. CIV. P. 20
(authorizing permissive joinder).
70. See Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principlesfor Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L.
REV. 65, 79-82 (2003) (stating that "courts understand opt outs as a pure expression of claimant
autonomy").
71. See generally Ronald Dworkin, The Concept ofAutonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS
ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 54, 61 (John Christman ed., 1989) (stating that "[t]he full formula for
autonomy... is authenticity plus procedural independence"); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits
of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978) (advocating increased participation in
adjudication).
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greater bargaining power, sustain a credible threat against the defendant,
reduce their transaction costs, and decrease the informational
asymmetries that arise between disaggregated plaintiffs and a common
defendant.72 In short, by making promises and assurances to other
plaintiffs and by forming a group, the plaintiff has determined that the
benefits of litigating together outweigh the loss of individual decisionmaking autonomy.
It is here that I would like to introduce some threads of political
theory for two relatively limited purposes. The first is to make the point
that our theoretical options are not limited to either social-welfare
maximization or individual autonomy.
Instead, strands of
communitarianism (or, as some in the field label it, republicanism 73) can
explain and harmonize the process in ways that welfare maximization
and individual autonomy cannot. My hesitance is that, although those
terms help avoid Redish's democratic critique and are convenient
shorthand for some of the ideas I find important, they also introduce a
flood of other implications that have little to do with the fairly narrow
point that I am making here. Nevertheless, I find them useful to rely on
with that caveat in place. Second, once we start to think about the
plaintiffs in nonclass aggregation as being in a community of sorts, then
we can also use democratic thought to explore how much leeway the
judicial system should afford them to self-govern.
A. Rethinking the DemocraticDifficulty with a Community of Plaintiffs
Thinking about group litigation in political terms raises similar
arguments to those raised in a much larger debate over the individual's
role in the democratic state. In political theory, the individual's place in
the polity lies at the heart of the debate between liberals and
communitarians, or as Charles Taylor urges, between atomists and
holists. 74 Of interest here-without wading in too deeply-is how each
school of thought perceives the individual's role in society.
Although both liberals and communitarians value self-determination,
liberalism elevates individual autonomy. According to John Rawls and
his "justice as fairness" argument, individual autonomy allows people to

72. Burch, supranote 44, at 48-49.
73. See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and Republicanism:Friends or Foes? A Reply to
Richard Dagger,61 REV. POL. 209, 209 (1999) (stating that Sandel uses the name "republicanism").
74. Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in DEBATES IN
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 195, 195 (Derek Matravers & Jonathan E. Pike eds.,

2003).
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act "from principles that they would acknowledge under conditions that
best express their nature as free and equal rational beings. 7 5 Democratic
communitarianism, on the other hand, sees history, social norms, and the
process of living in society as crucial elements of individual
development. Communitarianism thus does not reduce all moral claims
to what an individual would consent to or choose; rather, it contends that
individuals can incur responsibilities to one another simply by virtue of
being fellow citizens.76
Michael Walzer explains the liberal-communitarian debate in terms
of less-voluntary forms of association; his words are worth quoting at
length:
[P]eople are born into very important sorts of groups, born with
identities, male or female, for example, working class, Catholic or
Jewish, black, democrat, and so on. Many of their subsequent
associations (like their subsequent careers) merely express these
underlying identities, which, again, are not so much chosen as enacted.
Liberalism is distinguished less by the freedom to form groups on the
basis of these identities than the freedom to leave the groups and
sometimes even the identities behind. Association is always at risk in a
liberal society. The boundaries of the group are not policed; people
come and go, or they just fade into the distance without ever quite
acknowledging that they have left. That is why liberalism is plagued
by free-rider problems-by people who continue to enjoy the benefits
of membership and identity while77no longer participating in the
activities that produce those benefits.
Even though he writes in a political context, Walzer's observations about
free riders and unchosen associations apply with equal force in the
procedural aggregation context. No rational person chooses to be injured
by a drug or product, but once it happens to her and to many others with
aggregated claims, they are all in it together. Under the current centralplanning model, plaintiffs have few, if any, options to exit the

75. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 515 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971). No universal
definition of "autonomy" exists, but a detailed treatment of the subject is beyond this Article's
scope.
76. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE 223-25 (2009); CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in 2
PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 187, 204 (1985); Michael Walzer,

The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 15-16 (1990).
77. Walzer, supra note 76 (citation omitted); see also SANDEL, supra note 76, at 220 ("If we
understand ourselves as free and independent selves, unbound by moral ties we haven't chosen, we
can't make sense of a range of moral and political obligations that we commonly recognize, even
prize." Among such obligations, include those "of solidarity and loyalty, historic memory and
religious faith-moral claims that arise from the communities and traditions that shape our
identity."); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 36 (1989).
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aggregation, though they may remain disengaged from one another. In
class action litigation, on the other hand, entrepreneurial plaintiffs'
attorneys overcome collective-action problems by initiating litigation on
others' behalf. Of course, it is the entrepreneurial effort of one on
"behalf' of many that prompts Redish's democratic critique, that this
effort undermines the individual decision to sue and to direct the course
of that lawsuit.7 8 But, at least technically, in nonclass aggregation no one
person or small group of attorneys has nearly exclusive control over
others' right to sue in tort. This means, however, that the temptation to
free-ride is back, as is a new temptation to hold out by strategically
withholding consent in hopes of a higher payout when a settlement
demands nearly unanimous consent. Thus, the question has shifted to
what role the plaintiffs should play in this nonclass aggregation systema system in which they tend to have little control because of the sheer
numbers of nominally related plaintiffs, the difficulty of communicating
with multiple clients, and the inherent agency problems that arise when
one agent represents numerous principals with (sometimes) divergent
interests.
Drawing a line around actual, cohesive groups changes the calculus
in some interesting ways. First, in order to be in a group, the plaintiffs
must have implicitly consented. 79 As I have explored in greater detail
elsewhere, once plaintiffs begin communicating with one another about
their intentions concerning the litigation, they may reach broad
agreement about particular ends and make promises and assurances to
one another to act in ways that further those joint ends. 80 Those promises
and assurances form the social glue holding the group together; they are
moral obligations made voluntarily. Plus, because individuals have
exercised their free will to associate with other litigants, this alternative
line preserves the fundamental tenets of self-determination and consent
in liberal theory.8 1 One might claim that this attribute makes these
groups contractarian. For instance, as Michael Sandel explains the
liberal account of obligation: "Whether we must concern ourselves with
the good of other people depends on whether, and with whom, we have
agreed to do so."' 82 But to claim an exclusively liberal and atomistic
view ignores the complex psychological and social dynamics of groups,

78. Redish, supra note 38.
79. Burch, supranote 45, at 42-43.
80. Id. at 45-46.
81. See RAWLS, supra note 75, at 108-17 (explaining that obligations can arise through
voluntary acts, such as promises and agreements, and natural duties).
82. SANDEL, supra note 76, at 224.
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the moral component of promising, and the transformative nature of
social relationships-if not in a metaphysical sense, in a pragmatic,
obligation sense.
Picking up on this thread of morality and obligation brings me to the
second way in which redrawing the line around actual, cohesive groups
changes the litigation calculus. Group membership means that the
individuals contained within it have certain obligations to one another.
Granted, to say that someone is a group member says nothing about the
nature or content of those obligations. But suppose that there is a
proportional and reciprocal obligation (made, once again, through
voluntarily issued promises, assurances, or even tacit agreements) to
cooperate with one another.8 3 The liberal account of obligations as
consisting of voluntary promises would capture this aspect, but it fails to
account for obligations of solidarity or membership.8 4 Put differently, as
soon as two people disagree over what it is to cooperate and thus what
they have agreed to do, their obligations to one another may end. But if
they have incurred additional obligations of solidarity or membership by
virtue of being in community with
one another, then they're not off the
85
hook so easily (at least morally).

It is here that communitarianism plays a role. Plaintiffs who have
decided to work together, who have turned themselves into a "plural
subject," define the relevant community.86 A "plural subject" might
mean many things, but I use the term in a basic sense: when a set of
"'I's" becomes a single, plural subject-a "we. 87 When plaintiffs
decide to harness their fates together, to "pursue our goal" or to "win our
litigation," they are in it together. (I take it as a given here that a special
officer has helped sort plaintiffs into groups with like injuries and claims
so that their individual interests align with the group's collective
interest.) 88 The power of self-determination now rests with the collective
in a way that furthers communal interests and values, that carries out, in
other words, their obligations of solidarity. What's different, however, is
83. Although communitarians distinguish between voluntary associations and communities, the
distinctions are not categorical and the characteristics tend to overlap. The main question is whether
social relationships are based on reciprocal empathy, not just a means for attaining an individual
instrumental end. Alexander, supra note 59, at 26.
84.

SANDEL, supra note 76, at 225.

85.

To be sure, moral obligations can be quite different from legal obligations. This obligation

of solidarity does not readily translate into a legal obligation. See Burch, supra note 44, at 18-20.
86. MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 (2000); see also Burch, supra

note 45, at 23-26. 1 borrow this term from Margaret Gilbert, but do not use it in exactly the same
way that she does.
87. Burch, supranote 45, at 23-26.
88. For more about this sorting process, see Burch, supra note 44.
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that because we are talking principally about a voluntary exercise of the
will, through commitments and promises to other plaintiffs, we need not
completely disregard the norms of individual liberalism nor enter the
morass of hypothetical consent and social-contract theory. 89 The "catch"
from the liberal perspective is that once litigants make reciprocal
promises and assurances to one another to cooperate, they are not free to
leave the group if doing so would violate those promises or their
obligations of solidarity. Conversely, the disjunction with Sandel's
version of communitarianism is that these obligations of solidarity or
membership arise only after plaintiffs have defined the membership
through their voluntary association and can be captured, at least initially,
by an ethic of consent. 90
Consider an analogy to labor unions. The 1930s Wagner Act made it
possible for American workers to transform their unified interests and
solidarity into a formal bargaining unit when a majority of workers
favored the arrangement.
It thus overcame their collective-action
problem and, in some ways, the principal-agent problem (though it surely
created others) by allowing members to vote. Similarly, by encouraging
plaintiffs to communicate and associate with one another, several things
happen. First, after grouping with others who want similar ends and
have similar injuries, their interests are more cohesive. According to
current class action theory, this justifies binding their interests
collectively. Second, they are able-like unionized employees-to
better negotiate with their attorneys, monitor the litigation, and
participate in the process.
Third, unlike unions, the process of
voluntarily associating with one another does not per se involve those
who would prefer to be left out of the arrangement altogether. It thus
preserves a liberal sense of autonomy: one chooses whether to join the
group and how much to participate.
In sum, once we disaggregate the notion of group from the narrow
inquiry of whether cohesion predates the litigation, we can avoid some of
the problems caused by treating heterogeneous individuals as if their
interests are unitary. Binding interests that become unitary post litigation

89.

See Ronald Dworkin, The OriginalPosition, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 500,519-33 (1973).

90. SANDEL, supra note 76, at 241 ("We've been trying to figure out whether all our duties and
obligations can be traced to an act of will or choice." Sandel does not believe they can and argues
that "obligations of solidarity or membership may claim us for reasons unrelated to a choicereasons bound up with the narratives by which we interpret our lives and the communities we
inhabit."). Again, my point here is to use these philosophies in a narrow way, in the context of
nonclass aggregation, and not to make broader statements about their salience.
91. This might include a voting arrangement if the litigants have agreed to an intraclaimant
governance arrangement. Burch, supra note 44.
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eliminates the concern over representing absent group members. It
allows present plaintiffs to specify their interests and then pursue
homogeneous ends together. Litigating collective interests collectively
allows plaintiffs to present a unified, credible threat against the
defendant, to bargain and deliberate about what those collective interests
are and how they should go about fulfilling them, and to participate in
the process of pursuing their substantive rights. Put simply, diverse
subgroups with heavy plaintiff participation and deliberation are more
like an actual community (at least with regard to the litigation issues)
than a class action with absent class members or even classes with a
preexisting trait that has little to do with actual cohesion.
B. Community Self-Governance
Thus far, we have covered the criteria for subgroup membership:
sharing like intentions toward the defendant; having similar claims and
injuries; and, most importantly, making promises and assurances to
cooperate with one another in achieving the group's joint ends. The
event or events giving rise to the litigation-from taking and
experiencing the effects of the same drug (Vioxx, Zyprexa); to sharing
circumstances and histories (Vietnam in the Agent Orange Litigation,
being in the same nightclub fire together, or experiencing the same
hurricane or flood); to having the same product malfunction in ways that
change their lives (Bridgestone/Firestone Tire Litigation)-bring people
with shared emotional connections together. 92 As I've hinted, in largescale litigation it is highly unlikely that all plaintiffs will agree on their
litigation ends, that they will have the same or even highly similar
injuries, that they have uniformly strong claims, or that the same laws
will apply. Consequently, while further sorting like interests with other
like interests, subgroups will form.
Although this situation raises a constellation of questions about how
these subgroups interact with one another and how they could or should
reach decisions, my focus here is on a narrower issue. 93 If courts
recognize this alternative line-drawing scheme and foster group
formation after both the decision to sue and procedural aggregation, what

92. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (7th Cir.
2002); In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611-12 (E.D. La. 2008); In re Zyprexa
Prod. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Gray v. Derderian, 400 F. Supp. 2d
415, 419-20 (D.R.I. 2005); Louisiana v. All Prop. & Cas. Ins. Carriers, 937 So. 2d 313, 316-18 (La.
2006); PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 25-26 (1986).

93. I've explored many of these other issues in Burch, supra note 45.
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degree of autonomy ought the judicial system afford these litigation
groups?
One might think about subgroup and superordinate group autonomy
and why autonomy is valuable in terms of either pluralist or
communitarian theories. Although there is a great deal of tension
between the two perspectives, both have something to offer modem
litigation groups. By pluralists, I mean public-choice theorists who focus
on the role of and interplay between societal groups, which they view as
the organizational form for allowing a collection of individuals to further
their own interest. Some pluralists might explain the need for group
autonomy based on the freedom of association: so long as individuals
have openly agreed to associate, they should be able to establish the
terms and conditions of their relationships and should be free to leave the
group whenever they like.94 Other pluralists might contend that having
diverse subgroups with multiple perspectives on remedies and forceful
advocacy within litigation helps counter agency problems caused by a
strong plaintiffs'-attomey steering committee and weak client
monitoring. 95 Empowering groups ensures that their members have
access to the decision-making
process and better insulates them from
96
attorney neglect.
Pluralist thought takes up the familiar idea pushed by liberalsindividual autonomy-and imports it into the group context by viewing
groups as an instrumental means for pursuing individual interests.97 The
group is an association of individuals who each use the group to promote
their own welfare.98 Accordingly, the prescriptive lesson from pluralist
thought is that the judicial system should foster and enable group
formation, help sort plaintiffs into homogeneous subgroups, and enforce
the rules created through group governance because these rules reflect
the group's values and objectives.
Embracing pluralist ideas by
maintaining subgroups in aggregate litigation introduces dissent, which

94.
95.

See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 299-306 (1974).
See W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE PARADOX OF MASS POLITICS: KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION

INTHE AMERICAN ELECTORATE 126-27 (1986); Rhode, supra note 17, at 1223-24. Robert Dahl has
written several books providing a general account of pluralism in the political process. See generally
ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL (1982);
ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 22-24

(1967).
96. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 104-05 (1956); MICHAEL
WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP 224 (1970).

97. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 2.
98. See id. at 20.
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arguments, new ideas, forceful

advocacy, and-ultimately-increased legitimacy. 99

Like pluralists, communitarians view social groups and the need for
group autonomy as promoting social good.100 But communitarians
define "social good," in part, as the intrinsically invaluable process 0of1
group participation that leads one to define and fulfill her identity.
Communitarianism recognizes that with membership comes obligationeven when people consent to membership and even when individual
promises and assurances glue the group together.' 0 2 By designing an
arrangement that reflects members' commitments to one another and
captures community preferences for decision making, litigants can
legitimately curtail exit mechanisms. 10 3 This means, however, that
litigant communities must have some autonomy to self-govern and that
the judge should both enforce those arrangements and-by using a
special officer to avoid bias and the appearance 0of4 bias-help coordinate
subgroup and superordinate group relationships.
When plaintiff communities form from plaintiffs' affective ties with
each other, those communities mix contractarian and communitarian
dimensions. Although plaintiffs may voluntarily enter the group because
of a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis or for purely instrumental reasons,
once they are group members and have tied their collective litigation
fates together, their interactions tend to change their relationships. Social
psychologists and behavioral law-and-economics theorists characterize
this change in terms of developing other-regarding preferences. 10 5 It is
99. See NEUMAN, supranote 95, at 126-27.

100. Alexander, supranote 59, at 30.
101. See id. at 30-32 (describing the good as "fulfillment of the self achieved through...
community").
102. See id. at 26-28, 32.
103. For other discussion on this topic of exit, see Burch, supranote 45.
104. See generally A.L.I., supra note 63, § 3.17, § 1.05(c) (suggesting that judges should
"enforce parties' agreements regarding the conduct of litigation" and that litigants might enter into
an agreement governing their relationship and voting procedures).
105. See generally Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211
Sci. 1390 (1981); Kelly S. Bouras & S.S. Komorita, Group Discussion and Cooperation in Social
Dilemmas, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1144, 1145 (1996); Robert Boyd & Peter J.
Richerson, Cultural Transmission and the Evolution of Cooperative Behavior, 10 HUM. ECOLOGY
325 (1982); Nancy R. Buchan et al., Let's Get Personal: An International Examination of the
Influence of Communication, Culture and Social Distance on Other Regarding Preferences, 60 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 373-75 (2006); Joseph Henrich, Cultural Group Selection,
Coevolutionary Processes and Large-Scale Cooperation, 53 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 3 (2004);
Norbert L. Kerr & Cynthia M. Kaufman-Gilliland, Communication, Commitment, and Cooperation
in Social Dilemmas, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 513, 526-27 (1994); Mark Van Vugt &
Claire M. Hart, Social Identity as Social Glue: The Origins of Group Loyalty, 86 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 585, 586 (2004).
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here that pluralist or liberal thought fails to satisfactorily explain the
layers within social relationships and where a thicker conception of
moral obligation is needed. Otherwise, this account cannot reconcile
theory with reality. I thus find the concept of a plural subject a useful
alternative. 10 6 The theory is that you and I and many others might want
to do something together, to be jointly committed to attaining a particular
end and to specifying our day-to-day plans for fulfilling that end without
becoming an "entity" in the ontological sense, but without acting as
completely self-regarding individuals either.
Maintaining subgroups comprised of plural subjects who have
reached consensus about their litigation ends, who experienced similar
injuries, and who are thus more than nominally related protects
individuality without forgoing community. It also avoids a problem with
the entity theory, that once the entity exists, it can suppress individual
objections and cram down subsequent tensions between the principals
07
(the litigants) as well as between the principals and the agents.'
Fostering subgroups of plural subjects requires the aid of a special officer
who provides information and helps protect voice opportunities within
subgroups as well as the diversity of groups themselves. Put differently,
the special officer maintains group pluralism and each group designs its
own governance.
Maintaining a pluralistic subgroup structure does, however, create
tension between unity and cohesion on one hand and diversity on the
other. There is a risk that strongly autonomous groups will alienate
themselves from other plaintiffs. When a settlement offer demands
nearly unanimous consent, the larger community must decide what to do
and how to go about doing it. If the overarching community lacks
consensus, then it can resolve the dilemma by arguing, bargaining,
voting, or any combination thereof. 10 9 Plaintiffs might aggregate
106. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
107. See Issacharoff, supra note 34, at 374.
108. 1 have suggested in Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations that plaintiffs
might design a representative structure, where some subgroup members would represent the interests
of the subgroup on a steering committee. Burch, supra note 44, at 42-45. Most communitarians
would say that political participation must be unmediated in this way and that members' views
should be filtered through an intermediary. See, e.g., BENJAMIN B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY:
PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR ANEW AGE 261 (1984); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept,
93 HARv. L. Rsv. 1057, 1067-73 (1980). The reality, however, is that some litigants may not want
the litigation to become their lives; they have other demands on their time that they must prioritize.
109. Jon Elster, Introduction to DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 1, 5 (Jon Elster ed., 1998). Will
Kymlicka describes a similar dilemma over governance in countries that are both multinational and
polyethnic:
Self-government rights, however, do pose a threat to social unity. The sense of being a
distinct nation within a larger country is potentially destabilizing. On the other hand, the
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members' preferences (voting), transform members' preferences through
deliberation, 0 or misrepresent members' preferences by acting
strategically. "
Deliberating and voting are particularly relevant to the subgroup and
superordinate community structure. A system with a mix of deliberating
and voting would first allow plaintiffs to deliberate over the merits and
fairness of the settlement offer in an attempt to transform preferences.
After hearing those arguments (provided that plaintiffs have agreed to a
collective decision-making arrangement),"' plaintiffs would vote. That
vote would bind the entire community. Both deliberating and bargaining
may play a role when plaintiffs, with their attorneys' advice, first decide
on and consent to a collective decision-making arrangement. For
example, plaintiffs with more severe injuries and fewer causation
problems might legitimately push for a weighted voting structure that
would lessen the potential for a majority of claimants with weaker claims
to dilute the voting pool. 1 12 All plaintiffs would have equality of access
to the deliberation process, but not all plaintiffs would have equal voting
strength.1 13
Notice the parallel between genuine dialogue within the plaintiff
community about decision making and the idea of a deliberative
democracy where "democracy revolves around the transformation rather
than simply the aggregation of preferences."' 14 Just as participation and
deliberation by those who are subject to collective decisions enhances
democratic legitimacy, it also enhances judicial legitimacy by supplying
a fundamental component of procedural justice-the right to participate
and be heard." 5 To create and maintain community, deliberation is not
denial of self-government rights is also destabilizing, since it encourages resentment and
even secession. Concerns about social unity will arise however we respond to selfgovernment claims.
WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 192

(1995).
110. Elster, supra note 109, at 6.
111. See Burch, supranote 44, at 42-45.
112. Burch, supra note 44, at 62-64.
113. Plaintiffs might reach a similar result without having to value one another's claims by
requiring a supermajority of roughly eighty percent or more to accept a settlement offer.
114. Elster, supra note 109, at 1.
115. JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS,
CONTESTATIONS 1-2 (2000). As to procedural justice, see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE

LAW 133 (1990) (discussing literature evaluating the effects of increased litigant participation); see
also E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL,
COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 61 (1989) (discussing

litigants' perceived control of the litigation process); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 96-97 (1988) (discussing different theories for control over
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limited to arguments or rhetoric, but includes storytelling, personal
testimony, humor, reasons, explanations, and even gossip." 6
Communicating in this way allows plaintiffs to influence and, if they so
desire, to vote and be bound by collective outcomes.
Thus, if we define democracy as the extent to which the preferences
of the governed influence collective outcomes, then reconceiving the
line-drawing scheme can preserve and further core democratic values.' 17
Granted, this concept of democracy is abstract, but it must be. Opinions
about democracy vary greatly-from communitarian to liberal-and
truly democratic decisions must reflect the collective preferences of the
governed.
During deliberation, certain norms of propositional truth, rightness,
and truthfulness tend to steer and anchor debates, thereby compelling
even self-interested members to phrase their arguments in terms of what
is best for the group. 1 8 As I have argued elsewhere, group membership
and deliberation may have a transformative effect that leads to otherregarding preferences and thereby diminishes the potential for actors to
behave purely as homo economicus.119 But to reach this point, we must
be willing to recognize that we communicate with one another in new
ways, that communities are not limited to workplaces or neighborhoods,
and that true communities and regard for others arise out of our affective
ties-regardless of whether those ties exist before or after the decision to
sue.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article reconsiders the line-drawing scheme for nonclass
aggregation and hews historic rationales for group treatment to fit a new
kind of group. Put simply, once the judicial system determines that class

process and procedural fairness); Linda Musante et al., The Effects of Control on PerceivedFairness
of Procedures and Outcomes, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 223,237-38 (1983) (describing a
study where "[r]egardless of role in a dispute, the opportunity to exercise control through the
selection of a decision rule (no matter what the rule) resulted in enhanced evaluations of all aspects
of the trial experience"); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation,75
TEX. L. REv. 571, 602-04 (1997) (discussing the extent to which a class member has a right to
participate in class litigation).
116. See DRYZEK, supra note 115, at I (applying a "tolerant position" on what constitutes
authentic deliberation). For other variations on what counts as deliberation, see Elster, supra note
109, at 8-9.
117. DRYZEK,supra note 115, at2.
118. See generally 2 JtURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas

McCarthy trans., 1987).
119. Burch, supra note 44, at 28-32; Burch, supra note 45, at 47-53.
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action treatment is inappropriate, but litigants meet the loose
requirements for party and claim joinder under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 20 and 42, then judges should foster communication and
dialogue among the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs who communicate with one
another-regardless of whether they are in the same geographic
location-often form social bonds, as do, for example, Navy moms,
Somewhat like medieval
Army wives, and hurricane victims.
communities, they actually share affective ties and their relationships
evolve organically. This alternative scheme thus avoids presupposing
unity where none actually exists. By relying on plaintiffs' voluntary
promises and assurances to one another rather than on preexisting
external conditions such as the same skin color, employer, gender, or
injuries, this amended line need not bind litigants based on fictitious
notions of representation.
This line allows litigants to embrace more of a democratic ideal; the
communication process helps plaintiffs identify and specify their
litigation ends, sort themselves into groups with like-minded individuals,
and, ultimately, use this process to make key decisions about litigation
strategy and when and whether to settle. No longer can one attorney or
one group of attorneys make autocratic decisions on the group's behalf.
Correspondingly, the judicial system's role is to afford the group some
autonomy to self-govern, subject to the special officer's aid and
oversight. That governance regime is ultimately constrained by due
process, the mechanisms by which due process makes its way into each
state's rules of professional conduct, and adequate representation. 120 Yet,
it allows plaintiffs to cooperate with one another, to bind themselves to
the group process, and to limit or eliminate their ability to exit that
group. By questioning the assumption that groups must predate the
decision to sue, particularly in mass-tort litigation, we can avoid tenuous
justifications about interest representation and hypothetical consent and
make process more democratic.

120. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 756 (1989) (stating that "the linchpin of the
'impermissible collateral attack' doctrine-the attribution of preclusive effect to a failure to
intervene-is inconsistent with" Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Stender v. Lucky Stores,
Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302 (1992); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 798 (1985) (stating
that "the procedure followed by Kansas, where a fully descriptive notice is sent first-class mail to
each class member, with an explanation of the right to 'opt-out,' satisfies due process"); Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) (stating that "the judgment in a 'class' or 'representative' suit, to
which some members of the class are parties, may bind members of the class or those represented
who were not made parties to it"); see also Woolley, supra note 115, at 602-03 (discussing the
implications of Shutts).

